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Abstract: Rhetorical studies of science, technology, and medicine 
(RSTM) have provided critical understanding of how argument 
and argument norms within a field shape what is meant by “data.” 
Work has also examined how questions that shape data collection 
are asked, how data is interpreted, and even how data is shared. 
Understood as a form of argument, data reveals important insights 
into rhetorical situations, the motives of rhetorical actors, and the 
broader appeals that shape everything from the kinds of 
technologies built, to their inclusion in our daily lives, to the 
infrastructures of cities, the medical practices and policies 
concerning public health, etc. Big data merits continued attention 
from RSTM scholars as our understanding of its pervasive use and 
its ethos grows, but its arguments remain elusive (Salvo, 2012). To 
unpack the elusivity of big data, we explore one particularly 
illustrative case of big data and political, democratic influence: the 
Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal. To understand the case, 
we turn to social studies of data to explore the range of ethical 
issues raised by big data, and to examine the rhetorical strategies 
that entail big data. 
 
Keywords: Big Data, Cambridge Analytica, Ethics, Expertise, 
Facebook, Rhetoric of Technology 
Introduction  
Big data describes a range of ideas and activities that are difficult to 
illustrate precisely, and the polysemy of the term opens a space for 
various analyses. In this paper, we describe some developments of 
the term, its practical use to achieve influence, and how a rhetorical 
vantage might reveal sometimes overlooked actors and agents 
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involved in the rhetorical world of “big data.” No doubt the business 
of big data is flourishing, despite its uncertain meaning across 
fields. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the question of 
data, its collection and use, and its meaning, as well as what 
promises big data might hold to help map the spread of infection 
are featured in daily briefings, the nightly news, and newspapers 
around the world. Data holds promise for which we currently so 
desperately hope and, surely, big data must provide still more of 
what we need. As we examine what data itself means, and how big 
data is distinct, we find a much more complex story than the 
quantitative connotations of the term promise. Data is well known 
to be biased as a product of systems that are biased, including by 
racism and sexism (Hicks, 2018; Noble, 2018, especially on big data 
beginning on page 29), and big data, too, replicates such problems 
(Eubanks, 2018). Data and big data do not simply reveal the world 
to us, but help to craft the world, and so those who construct those 
data are rhetorically significant actors. So, too, are those who are 
responsible for making data meaningful to problems. We might call 
such actors “data analytics experts” and their particular expertise is 
also an important key to understanding big data and its rhetorical 
significance and influence. In this essay, we explore how big data is 
rhetorically distinct from previous conceptions of data, and how the 
rhetorical actors and agents involved in big data may come to shape 
its meaning. Importantly, we also explore the rhetorics of big data 
itself and how its promises and perils entail old rhetorical and 
ethical problems. We do so by exploring what we hope is perhaps 
an outlier case, but a case that seems all too relevant for all its 
complexity and indeterminacy: Cambridge Analytica. 
Cambridge Analytica was a U.K.-based consulting company that 
was involved with a large data breach of Facebook user data. The 
widely reported story of Cambridge Analytica follows that data from 
Facebook was used to help develop “profiles” of voters that could 
then be used to develop targeted political messaging. Messaging 
was shared through social media platforms and aimed at 
“persuadables” to encourage them to vote (or not) in a favorable 
direction to the clients of Cambridge Analytica (Amer & Noujaim, 
2019). In then-Chief Executive Alexander Nix’s words, “... we were 
able to use data to identify that there was very large quantities of 
persuadable voters there that could be influenced to vote for the 
Trump campaign from this day forward” (Channel 4 News, 2018). 
At another level, however, big data as a concept itself seemingly 
became a tool of persuasion among clients while the actual 
practices of the company may have involved less than data-driven 
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approaches. For example, a Channel 4 News undercover story 
revealed the CEO of Cambridge Analytica suggesting the company 
had used tactics that may be considered entrapment (Channel 4 
News, 2018). Cambridge Analytica’s motto, “Data drives all that we 
do”1 (Frankenfield, 2018, para. 2), it would seem, was something of 
an over-simplification and points to some of the concerning 
marketing and conversations surrounding big data. Later, after the 
Cambridge Analytica story broke and as the fallout generated 
discussions about data privacy, big data once again became a tool of 
persuasion, this time among publics, to suggest that the 
conversation ought to focus on who is collecting our data rather 
than, say, the persuasive tactics that may have been used in the U.S. 
and U.K. and before that with elections in Nigeria, Kenya, the Czech 
Republic, India, and Argentina (Channel 4 News, 2018). 
Numerous aspects of this case deserve attention, but for the 
purposes of this essay, we wish to focus on the use of “big data” as a 
concept in Cambridge Analytica’s work. Ultimately, lawmakers in 
both the U.S. and Britain called for further investigation of 
Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in the U.S. 2016 elections and 
the Brexit referendum. The story is a complicated one, but an 
essential contention about the business model for Cambridge 
Analytica was their use of data collected from Facebook. As one 
engages more deeply in the complex case of Cambridge Analytica, 
which includes purported data breaches, concealing breaches, but 
also tactics as suggested in the Channel 4 undercover study, one 
begins to doubt the centrality of data analytics alone. In the case of 
Cambridge Analytica, locating data at the nexus of the scandal that 
in fact involves much older ethical problems in persuading 
audiences may divert attention from important questions rhetorical 
scholars can address. As Cambridge Analytica Global Political 
Managing Director Mark Turnbull points out in Channel 4 News’ 
undercover video, “We just put information into the bloodstream of 
the Internet and then just watch it grow” (Channel 4 News, 2018). 
Focus on the data and technological systems alone moves  
attention away from another narrative, one much less 
technologically impressive, but revealing of the broader milieu that 
shapes rhetorical situations where data-driven responses are 
enacted. Put simply, big data in this scenario might allow for a 
 
1 After Cambridge Analytica’s motto, and for editorial consistency with 
the quotations we draw from in our case analysis, we use the word “data” 
as a singular noun throughout this article. 
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novel manner by which to classify voters and craft messaging, 
although this is debated (Szalai, 2019), but it is the socio-rhetorical 
situation that will inform how messages are crafted, not only big 
data insights. We wish in our analysis then to hold attention on two 
key facets of big data: its media form, and its influence on 
constructing a rhetorical situation and the attendant response. 
Before investigating one case that illustrates these two facets, some 
definitional work is necessary to reveal the underlying complexity 
of data and big data. We then discuss the role of big data ethics, 
ultimately focusing on the nature of data analytic expertise and the 
importance of truth and trust in experts working with big data. 
The Meaning of Data and Big Data 
Revealing the complexities of big data is usefully approached by 
first exploring the idea of data itself. Data, Rosenberg (2013a) 
reminds us, is not an immaterial but a material thing. Although it is 
common to think of data as a semiotic object of analysis, and 
indeed it might be, there is in fact a kind of materiality (in addition 
to its semiotic or representational comportment toward an “object 
in reality”) that makes data particularly persuasive. Understanding 
data as forming facts versus reflecting facts is less obvious than one 
might initially conclude. This is an issue that Rosenberg in his 
(2013a) chapter “Data before the Fact” illuminates using Mary 
Poovey’s discussion of facts versus data, when she writes “What are 
facts? Are they incontrovertible data that simply demonstrate what 
is true?” Rosenberg observes that, to Poovey, “Facts may be 
conceived either as theory-laden or as simple and incontrovertible” 
and, “In the latter case, we call them ‘data.’” (p. 17). However, this 
reasoning also opens a complicating line of inquiry such that, if 
facts are made up of multiple data, then data can potentially be 
viewed as “theory-laden” as well. Several related terms are worth 
pausing to consider here, notably “fact” and “evidence,” which 
Rosenberg (2013a) defines as follows: 
The word “data” comes to English from Latin. It is the 
plural of the Latin word datum, which itself is the neuter 
past participle of the verb dare, to give. A “datum” in 
English, then, is something given in an argument, 
something taken for granted. This is in contrast to “fact,” 
which derives from the neuter past participle of the Latin 
verb facere, to do, whence we have the English word 
“fact,” for that which was done, occurred, or exists. The 
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etymology of “data” also contrasts with that of 
“evidence,” from the Latin verb vidére, to see. (p. 18) 
Taken together, Rosenberg explains that each of these terms 
provide important contributions to knowledge-making systems, 
arguing that “facts are ontological, evidence is epistemological, data 
is rhetorical” (Rosenberg, 2013a, p. 18). To understand how data is 
rhetorical, it is instructive to look back even earlier than the term’s 
Latin form. Data also has early specialist or technical meaning, 
which can be found in its Greek form (dedomena). The 4th century 
BCE mathematician Euclid used data as “givens” (what is known 
and can be used to solve problems), and this use of the term in 
mathematics would have considerable staying power. Throughout 
the early modern period, this meaning of data as a given remained 
in use, particularly in the fields of math and theology, Rosenberg 
explains, and in these fields, “data referred to things taken for 
granted and thus not inquired after” (emphasis original, 2013b, p. 
560). In English, data would be imported through mathematics in 
the 18th century and would have retained its powerful persuasive 
appeal. Consistent across Latin and vernacular uses in English, 
data did not refer to an objective, out-there, capitalized truth, but 
rather to “claims accepted for the sake of argument” (Rosenberg, 
emphasis original, 2013b, p. 561). Rosenberg explains, “What made 
such claims ‘data’ was their rhetorical status, not some intrinsic 
formal or material quality: in another argument, the very same 
statements might not be ‘data’ at all” (2013b, p. 561). The data was, 
this is to say, situated by the particular argument or rhetoric within 
which an argument unfolded. But as data was adapted from a Latin 
word into the vernacular English, it transformed in an important 
manner. Data began to be used in the singular in English, a shift 
from its plural Latin form (Rosenberg, 2013a, p. 19), and with this 
shift the “English language provides tools for discussing ‘data’ as 
something” (Rosenberg, emphasis original, 2013b, p. 562). Further, 
the ideas concerning “what constituted givenness were changing,” 
coming to “evoke a particular sort of representational entity upon 
which one could operate through systems of calculation, 
classification, and communication, while holding the question of 
referential truth in abeyance” (Rosenberg, emphasis original, 
2013b, pp. 565–566). Articulating data in this way provides us with 
a framework for meaningfully talking about big data, which 
Emmanuel and Stanier (2016) describe as “the collection, 
processing, analysis and visualization associated with very large 
data sets,” and as “an umbrella term to cover a range of data, 
technologies and applications” (p. 1). Big data then is not just data 
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per se but instead operates as a complex system of objects, methods 
of collection and analysis, and tools for visualizing. Whereas 
Rosenberg (2013a) observes that we “want to give data an essence, 
to define what exact kind of fact data is,” in our present moment “it 
may be that the data we collect and transmit has no relation to 
truth or reality whatsoever beyond the reality that data helps us to 
contrast” (p. 37).  
From Rosenberg’s historical analysis of the word “data” we find 
several developments essential to understanding contemporary 
uses of the term. Most notably, we observe the manner by which 
data once operated rhetorically as situated with respect to a 
particular argument, and how the word transformed from the 
plural Latin form through vernacular use in English as either plural 
or singular, which in turn affords the possibility of a materiality to 
the givenness of data. Before turning to the materiality of data, we 
first want to explore the matter of givenness and the rhetoricity of 
data. The importance of understanding the situatedness of data in 
its ancient or modern sense, with respect to argument, is what 
makes data an object of rhetorical inquiry. After Boyd and Crawford 
(2012), we acknowledge that big data is more than a technological 
fact; rather, big data comprises a cultural, technological, and 
scholarly phenomenon that highlights technology (“computational 
power and algorithmic accuracy”), analysis (enabling pattern 
identification “to make economic, social, technical, and legal 
claims”), and mythology (“promise of higher form of intelligence 
and knowledge … with aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy”) (p. 
663). And the interplay of these phenomena is part of the problem 
of big data: if we cannot guess at the power of big data in terms of 
tracking and capturing people’s behaviors, we are susceptible to 
unsubstantiated claims about the power and objectivity of numbers 
to predict and influence human behaviors. As Iliadis and Russo 
(2016) warn, “Big Data must remain open to cultural, ethical, and 
critical perspectives, particularly when viewed as a modern archive 
of data facts and data fictions. Data, along with its sciences and 
infrastructures, are informed by specific histories, ideologies, and 
philosophies that tend to remain hidden....” (p. 2).  
Definitions you might find of big data—were you to glance at an 
industry website—might not highlight these features but do include 
both technical and non-technical features. Beginning with some 
examples of the technical features, SAS (n.d.) writes “Big data is a 
term that describes the large volume of data – both structured and 
unstructured – that inundates a business on a day-to-day basis,” 
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and Oracle Canada (n.d.) explains “Big data is data that contains 
greater variety arriving in increasing volumes and with ever-higher 
velocity. ... big data is larger, more complex data sets, especially 
from new data sources. These data sets are so voluminous that 
traditional data processing software just can’t manage them.” IBM 
(n.d.) defines big data as “the use of advanced analytic techniques 
against very large, diverse data sets that include structured, semi-
structured and unstructured data, from different sources, and in 
different sizes from terabytes to zettabytes,” adding also some of 
the characteristics of big data, including “high volume, high velocity 
or high variety.” Big data is structured, unstructured, complex, new. 
SAS (n.d.) also defines big data by its purpose: “But it’s not the 
amount of data that’s important. It is what organizations do with 
the data that matters. Big data can be analyzed for insights that lead 
to better decisions and strategic business moves.” And Oracle 
Canada (n.d.) notes, “But these massive volumes of data can be 
used to address business problems you wouldn’t have been able to 
tackle before,” while IBM (n.d.) tells us that “Analysis of big data 
allows analysts, researchers and business users to make better and 
faster decisions using data that was previously inaccessible or 
unusable.” Approaches are used, according to IBM (n.d.), “to gain 
new insights from previously untapped data sources independently 
or together with existing enterprise data.” Thus, we learn that there 
are multiple purposes to which big data might be put, for example 
in the financial industry (Tett, 2018), regulation (Groenfeldt, 
2020), and in tracking COVID-19 symptoms (Yasinski, 2020). Big 
data can simultaneously be viewed comparatively in terms of 
relational and other systems views such as graph theory or object 
orientation, or big data can be viewed in terms of attributes—that 
is, the three Vs, volume, velocity, and variety (Gandomi & Haider, 
2015; Uprichard, 2013)2—or in terms of its architectural or 
environmental constraints, where we think about big data in terms 
of horizontal scaling and parallel processing and, importantly, as 
being non-relational in nature (Emmanuel & Stanier, 2016, pp. 2–
3). Data then is both analytically generated and analyzed by data 
analysis experts. And thus, after Rosenberg (2013a), we argue that 
 
2 As a construct, the idea of big data is often discussed in terms of the 
“3Vs” of volume, velocity, and variety, and other lists of V-words 
(Gandomi & Haider, 2015; Uprichard, 2013) and even P-words such as 
political, partial, and predictive (Lupton, 2015), but Kitchin (2013, 2014) 
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“it is this rhetorical aspect of the term ‘data’ that has made it 
indispensable” (p. 37). 
In asking “what makes big data big” we find ourselves frequently 
being asked to interrogate both the quantitative and qualitative 
qualities that make big data distinct from regular data. When 
Kitchin and McArdle (2016) ask “What makes Big Data, Big Data” 
in their article, they provide an answer that demands rhetorical 
inquiry. First, they chart a similar argument we have made here: 
big data, as an idea, is nebulous (cf. Favaretto, De Clercq, Schneble, 
& Elger, 2020). Definitions often focus on the size of a dataset, the 
conditions of its construction and creation, and perhaps its 
structure, but not the ontological characteristics of big data. Kitchin 
and McArdle provide an important intervention identifying this 
erasure of big data’s quiddity as a central theoretical question. 
Through a survey of previous studies in big data, they identify 
several characteristics that are notably distinct in what we might 
call big data from smaller datasets. Comparability is an interesting 
characteristic that distinguishes big data, providing perhaps 
“greater comparability between countries,” but also has potentially 
greater challenges in terms of representativeness, reporting errors, 
missing data, and outliers (Kitchin & McArdle, 2016, p. 3, Table 2). 
Biases, too, are a matter of distinction: we do not know them. 
Sampling errors and non-sampling errors are notable, as well; 
Kitchin and McArdle write, “missing data, reporting errors and 
outliers although possibly less frequently occurring, and new types 
of errors” (Kitchin & McArdle, 2016, p. 3, Table 2). A significant 
volume of data exists relative to other sources; these data might be 
national or international, and the demographics might be more 
difficult to measure. Intellectual property is yet another 
consideration. Purpose, however, is the most notable of the 
distinguishing characteristics from a rhetorical vantage. Survey 
data, for instance, is “Designed for statistical purposes” and 
administrative data is “Designed to deliver/monitor a service or 
program” but big data is “Organic (not designed) or designed for 
other purposes” (Kitchin & McArdle, 2016, p. 3, Table 2). Purpose 
is a central concern in distinguishing big data from other kinds of 
data. Purposelessness of some form of big data, too, can be a 
distinguishing factor. When Kitchin and McArdle identify purpose 
as one distinction in big data, writing that its purpose is “organic 
(not designed) or designed for other purposes,” the concept of big 
data is interestingly complicated (2016, p. 3). If we cannot identify 
the purpose for which data was identified, isolated, and then 
collected, that is, the rhetorical conception of data as a kind of 
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argument, then new tools for understanding the rhetorical work 
accomplished by big data are required. 
Another way to think about purpose might be to ask about the 
motive behind the data collection, as well as the analysis and use, 
and these questions entail another theme: expertise. As Hartelius 
(2018) writes of big data in her rhetorical analysis of the United 
Nations Global Pulse program mission to integrate big data into 
humanitarian development efforts, “Of primary concern regarding 
big data are, in tandem, expertise and motive” (p. 68). Protagoras’s 
homo mensura doctrine, Hartelius argues, is illustrative of how 
data and big data are ontologically determinate through the 
perceptual gaze of the human. Hartelius writes that “digital data 
about humans in the world exists only when, and because, it is 
collected as data” (emphasis original, p. 70). The United Nations 
Global Pulse program, Hartelius explains, uses big data to set policy 
agendas, and for that reason it is critical to understand the function 
of data in that “Information becomes the foundation for 
deliberation and judgement, both of which can serve good or evil” 
(2018, p. 68). The sophistic understanding of why we measure and 
what that means for how we create knowledge in the world also 
moves us away from conflating data with positivistic notions of fact 
or truth to be discovered in the world. Hartelius (2018) explains,  
Protagoras’s perspective on measurement and 
understanding is strikingly relevant: Humans are 
compelled to measure, to pursue knowledge. Acting on 
that compulsion, we not so much discover an external 
reality as we invent a structure, or a technology, that 
reflects our own positionality and agenda. That is, we 
find what we were looking for; not because it was ‘out 
there’ but because that is what we knew to seek. (p. 69) 
Big data in some ways gives us more to look through, and perhaps 
better tools for looking through, but it remains true that knowing 
what to seek is a key to making the enterprise of “analytics” a useful 
one. Floridi (2012), too, explains the importance of seeking, noting 
that big data is not well-defined and alluding “to an overwhelming 
sense that we have bitten off more than we can chew” (p. 436). He 
explains that it is not the overabundance of data that is a problem 
since it is a “resource” (p. 436); rather, it is important to know what 
one is looking for in that data. Floridi echoes Plato’s Cratylus, 
writing that “the game will be won by those who ‘know how to ask 
and answer questions’” (qtd. in Floridi, 2012, p. 437). 
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Appropriately, Floridi explains who will do this asking and 
answering: “such epistemological skills are taught and applied by a 
black art called analytics” (2012, p. 437). In this art, the job is to 
seek and not find, but invent. By invent, we invoke the rhetorical 
sense of invention, to oppose the idea of merely discovering what is 
“out there,” as Hartelius observes (p. 68). Because invention is 
critical to this work, looking to those who have the capacity for such 
invention is central to understanding the purpose of big data and 
the ethical entailments of such inventional work. Giardullo (2016) 
sees this as the pragmatic work of all social science researchers, to 
carefully choose among alternative methodological choices in the 
design of the research where methodological questions about big 
data are essentially methodological questions about data in general 
(p. 544). Having unpacked the complexity of defining big data and 
before we examine the nature of expertise and ethics in such 
analytic work, we turn to an illustrative case, Cambridge Analytica. 
Cambridge Analytica and Purpose 
It was an international scandal involving numerous governments 
and nations’ elections that brought to our attention again to the 
ways in which social media data—as big data—might be used to 
change our behaviors beyond the products we buy. The Cambridge 
Analytica scandal revealed, and continues to reveal, the pervasive 
way some of our most fundamental public and private institutions 
and our democratic systems are threatened by persuasive appeals 
delivered to our feeds without our knowledge, consent, or 
transparency. What began as discussions about sophisticated tools 
for analysis and exclamations about the power of big data turned 
gradually to warnings about purposeful misinformation and 
descriptions of the dangers of information fragmentation. Most of 
the individuals involved in the scandal strongly deny any 
wrongdoing, even as scientific researchers and the general public 
grapple with the realization that their personal data can be 
employed in ways they might not be comfortable with and that 
might reveal personal information they did not intend to share 
(Anonymous, 2018). 
The London-based company Cambridge Analytica reportedly used 
87 million users’ data (Kang & Frenkel, 2018) that “was obtained 
and used without permission” from Facebook to build voter profiles 
(Rosenberg, Confessore, & Cadwalladr, 2018). Indeed, as far back 
as 2014, Cambridge Analytica gave John Bolton—Trump’s eventual 
national security advisor—and his super PAC a prototype of its 
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Facebook data-driven profiling technology. And what the company 
promised in return was to build a set of tools that could “identify 
the personalities of American voters and influence their behavior” 
(Rosenberg, Confessore, & Cadwalladr, 2018). CBC News described 
how Cambridge Analytica claims to know a great deal about online 
users: the company can “combine standard data-mining techniques 
(e.g., geography, age, gender) with personality modeling, so called 
psychographics (e.g., education, shopping, interests, etc.)” (Larsen, 
2018). In addition to data mining, another layer of user information 
is reportedly added, one that is “about personality, decision 
making, and motivation” (example words they then referred to 
included “openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism”) (Larsen, 2018).  
One early source of insider information about how Cambridge 
Analytica was data mining, personality modeling, and narrative 
targeting was then-28-year-old whistleblower Christopher Wylie, a 
Canadian data consultant who worked for the company from 2013 
to 2014. Wylie, who has described himself as “one of the creators of 
Cambridge Analytica” (Wylie, 2019), “a founder” (Blatchford, 
2018), and as “director of research” (Cadwalladr, 2018), argued that 
the company was a data-mining “arsenal of weapons” in a culture 
war (Wylie, 2019). Sharing his experiences working for Cambridge 
Analytica when he testified before the U.S. Congress in June, 2018, 
Wylie began his story when he joined Strategic Communication 
Laboratories (SCL), a company that he claimed was “supplying the 
U.K. Ministry of Defense and NATO armies with expertise in 
information operations” (Wylie, 2019). Specifically, the company 
gained access, according to Schneble, Elger, and Shaw (2018), to 
“320,000 user profiles and their friends’ data through the 
‘thisisyourdigitallife' app” developed by Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, an 
assistant professor of psychology and neuroscience at Cambridge 
University, U.K. Bartlett (2018) and Patrikarakos (2019) estimate 
that Cambridge Analytica had between 2,000 and 5,000 data 
points on 240 million Americans over eighteen years of age.  
After the scandal broke in March, 2018, with the publication of 
Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison’s (2018) story in The Guardian 
and Rosenberg, Confessore, and Cadwalladr’s (2018) story in The 
New York Times, an interesting follow-up to the story involved a 
professor, Dr. David Carroll, at New York’s Parsons School of 
Design who employed a British data protection law to sue 
Cambridge Analytica to find out what data the company collected 
about him. Notably, it was not Carroll’s idea to sue Cambridge 
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Analytica; it was first the idea of Paul-Olivier Dehaye, a researcher 
in Geneva, Switzerland, who runs a nonprofit named 
Personaldata.IO. Dehaye was investigating SCL’s claims about the 
influence of its data-collection methods on the Brexit referendum 
outcome in the U.K. (Lapowsky, 2019), and he even paid the 10-
pound fee for the request for data disclosure that David Carroll 
submitted. If Carroll was unable to win the appeal to view the data 
that Cambridge Analytica had collected on him, he reasoned that 
Americans would be able to see how citizens of the U.K. had certain 
legal rights to privacy under U.K. law. Initially, Carroll received an 
Excel file from the data compliance team at Strategic 
Communication Laboratories (Cambridge Analytica’s parent 
company) that contained information on where Carroll lived, how 
he voted, and how much he cares on a scale from 0 to 10 about 
issues like the national debt and gun rights. Carroll pushed for the 
specific data they had collected about him, and Cambridge 
Analytica refused to provide it. Ultimately Carroll’s lawyers filed a 
court order for Cambridge Analytica and their parent company, 
SCL (O’Sullivan, 2018). Although he won the case, Carroll never 
received data from SCL or Cambridge Analytica, even as the 
companies filed for insolvency proceedings in May 2018 and are 
now defunct. Channel 4 News (2020) did recently obtain what they 
referred to as “the Trump Campaign database” and David Carroll’s 
data file, a file that contained his “personality scores”—openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism 
scores—in addition to “Lifestyle and Spending Habits” presented as 
variables such as “Avid Gamers Model = 8,” “Impulse Buyer Model 
= 9,” or “Cat product model = 3.” Carroll concluded, “This is what 
we were fighting to get; this is what I knew was there” (Carroll qtd. 
in Channel 4 News, 2020); however, the data does not tell us what 
models were used to generate numerical values for each variable 
and it is still not clear how the personality scores informed message 
microtargeting or if they even did. 
There are numerous layers of concerning ethical behavior 
operating here, most of which are still being investigated and 
discussed.3 It is perhaps useful to begin early in the development of 
these profiles. First, Kogan collaborated with two colleagues, 
 
3 As of 5 October 2020, though, the U.K.’s Insolvency Service did 
disqualify Alexander Nix, ex-CEO of Cambridge Analytica, from “holding 
directorships, or from promoting, forming or managing a company” for 
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Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell of the Psychometrics Centre at 
Cambridge University on the data-mining algorithms used in the 
psychological testing app; Kosinski and Stillwell were reportedly 
excluded from the collaboration with SCL, the parent company of 
Cambridge Analytica and in 2015 when Kogan applied for 
university ethics approval to use the data he collected, his 
application was denied (Lewis, Grierson, & Weaver, 2018). This is 
not entirely surprising because the app in question was designed to 
look like a personality test but, when downloaded, obtained access 
to the user’s profile information and that of their friends (Szalai, 
2019). Another issue was that users were able to give consent for 
access to their friends’ data as well as their own. Facebook’s terms 
of service do not allow sharing of data with third-party vendors; 
however, allowing app designers to collect user data is not against 
its terms of service (Hertwer, 2018). Facebook “demanded that the 
company simply delete the data” but they did not admit to the 
public that they knew about the data violation or about the 
company’s actions (Schneble, Elger, & Shaw, 2018). Ultimately, 
there would be more concerns about the engagements of 
Cambridge Analytica than their use of Facebook data, reminding us 
that the story is of more than the power of big data. Wylie has been 
quoted as saying it “frustrates me … how dominant the Facebook 
angle of the story was, when there’s so much [obscenities]ed-up 
[obscenities] that Cambridge Analytica were doing in different 
parts of the world” (Cadwalladr, 2019). Adding frustratingly more 
complexity to the case, Peter Pomerantsev reports in his (2019) 
book, This is Not Propaganda, that Nigel Oakes, the founder of 
SCL, told Pomerantsev that “he was skeptical that Facebook ‘likes’ 
and online product purchases could replicate months of in-depth, 
in-field research” (p. 184). Oakes’s original model for the branch of 
SCL would be rebranded as Cambridge Analytica’s (p. 184).    
Virtues and Vices in Big Data Ethics 
In traditional data ethics there is considerable attention given to the 
humans impacted by the collection and use of data. In the case of 
Cambridge Analytica, much public debate on this scandal 
surrounds issues of privacy, consent, and research ethics 
concerning human subjects. Some questions are related specifically 
to who consented to the use of Facebook data, for use by which 
actors in the scandal, and if participants knew the ends to which 
their data would be put. We also acknowledge the importance of 
privacy and resisting surveillance. For example, there are several 
concerns, such as surveillance or exacerbation of inequalities, 
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raised with large-scale COVID-19 mobile tracking apps in the U.S. 
used for contact tracing (Frith & Saker, 2020). And the science and 
technology of contact tracing apps are less than settled. As British 
Columbia’s provincial health officer Dr. Bonnie Henry has noted, 
when considering contact tracing apps, it is important to “find the 
right IT support for the work that we’re doing that doesn’t create 
more problems than it solves” (Canadian Press, 2020). That is, 
given that the practice of contact tracing is already well-established 
in scientific expert communities, technical solutions need to 
augment those processes rather than providing, as Henry states, 
“generic messages about who they may or might have been in 
contact with” (Canadian Press, 2020). Another important question 
concerning big data is: how do we ensure ethics approval or, at 
least, ethical use for repurposed data? In the case of Cambridge 
Analytica, much of the data set that their analysts used to generate 
user “universes” was legally obtained, through purchases of credit-
card behaviors, consumer spending data, phone surveys, and so on 
(Bartlett, 2018). As well, Kogan, the Cambridge University 
professor who co-constructed the personality test app that 
harvested Facebook data without obtaining permission, was also 
unable to obtain permission from Cambridge University’s ethics 
board to collect the data in the first place. We cannot fully 
understand the rhetorical possibilities of big data nor the kinds of 
experts charged with creating meaning from those data without 
understanding the broader ecology within which data is generated.  
There are indeed actors we might consider beyond the human in 
this broader ecology. Human-generated content can be used to 
inject divisive cultural materials to encourage partisan polarization, 
voter apathy, and perhaps worse. As the content is circulated, 
people “like” or share the content, and data about these circulations 
and engagements are once again integrated back into the big data 
set. Big data is, in this way, recursive. Big data is produced by user-
generated inputs, but big data produces the conditions for those 
user-generated inputs. Behind the scenes there are certainly human 
agents put “information into the bloodstream of the Internet” as 
quoted above from the undercover Channel 4 documentary (2018). 
Yet, to borrow a metaphor of our pandemic time of writing, what 
has been injected can be understood as an infectious agent, which 
now spreads among hosts, reliant upon the human subject but 
changing that subject, spreading beyond that subject, and evolving 
in a broader techno-human ecology of social and online media 
platforms. Big data, in this way, acts as a thing somewhat outside of 
the control of human actors. Put another way, the data is borne of a 
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different rhetorical situation; it takes shape not merely as 
constructed arguments within a particular context in big data 
situations, but rather comes to the situation as an actor, shaped by 
previous circumstances, and acts both by its original (now 
decontextualized) design and also as nodes within a network that 
can respond unpredictably. Mauthner (2019) argues for a post-
humanist position on big data ethics by eschewing positivist 
perspectives, discovery-based epistemologies with the hopes of 
revealing truths to be found in the data, or even humanist notions 
of socially constructed reality. 
Following the work of Barad (2007), Haraway (1988), and others, 
Mauthner argues that the posthuman ethical framework “shifts the 
focus away from the power of researchers over research 
participants toward the “world-making” powers of practices of 
inquiry: their ability to constitute the very nature of their 
objects/subjects of study” (2019, p. 671). What is considered to be 
“unethical” in this framework is “claims to innocently represent the 
world ‘as it really is’” (Mauthner, 2019, p. 671). Such an approach is 
an important addition to thinking on data ethics insofar as it 
extends the range of matters to be considered. Still, we disagree 
with some of the characterizations in this account that posit that a 
humanist ethics is one that “takes the rational human subject as 
both the locus of moral agency and object of ethical concern” 
(Mauthner, 2019, p. 674). Indeed, the rhetorical tradition has long 
challenged the idea of the rational human subject and attendant 
problems with that language, and is more comfortable with the 
charge of “intentional human subjects” (if not conflated with 
rational as Mauthner does) as a focal point of rhetorical-humanist 
inquiry (Mauthner, 2019, p. 679). Mauthner’s approach offers a 
lens to examine the way that (big) data comes to shape our world 
through practices in knowledge-making, and this is a key 
consideration when we ask what happens once the results of 
analytic work are “injected” online. Mauthner explains, 
The object of ethical concern is not humans but the 
world-making powers of practices of inquiry—their 
ability to bring specific configurations of the world into 
existence. It is in this sense that ethics is seen as 
inseparable from knowledge making and is understood 
as responsibility and accountability for the performative 
effects of knowledge practices—where responsibility and 
accountability are conceptualized in other than 
humanist terms. (2019, p. 681) 
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We find this framing helpful as a way to consider a variety of 
problems that this case presents beyond the most obvious (and, we 
add, quite serious) matters of humanistic concern, including 
privacy and autonomy. Specifically, we are interested in those 
questions of the “world-making powers” that might be circulating 
online. How do platforms participate in rhetorical appeals (Kelly 
[now Mehlenbacher], Kittle Autry, & Mehlenbacher, 2014; Moriarty 
& Mehlenbacher, 2019), and how do those objects—or, things—act 
upon us and with us to in turn continue knowledge-making? We are 
also interested in questions that take an environmental perspective 
concerned with the impacts of energy demands that big data and 
supporting computational systems require. Particularly, we are 
interested in inquiring after the ethical consequences of 
unnecessary cycles and annual terawatt hours being committed to 
big data computing storage and analysis, especially if big data 
cannot deliver the insights being promised. If we were to answer 
these questions we might also ask where responsibility lies 
(Johnson & Johnson, 2018). To answer these questions, however, is 
not possible with the current status of this case, or in fact our own 
expertise. Indeed, the case itself is not transparent, and the science 
is not settled, so instead we pose these questions as broader themes 
to address in the study of big data. Such questions are important, 
and so too is taking a less human-centric approach to understand 
those ethical entailments. But we here return to humans because it 
is those rhetorical actors who have obfuscated the case in such a 
manner that it becomes a challenge to move into these posthuman 
questions. Because we lack access due to the proprietary nature of 
the data and systems, and lack technical expertise along with 
expertise in the psychological sciences, we, like many other non-
experts in these domains, look to those brokers of specialist or 
technical knowledge to understand the actors, the stakes, the 
situation, and the appeals: the experts. 
Indeed, to understand moral dimensions of big data, it is critically 
important to examine key actors as they work to rhetorically frame 
the discourse. Certainly, as the Cambridge Analytica case has 
shown, accessing the data itself or the technological mediations that 
entail the data collection and analysis process is not always 
possible. Indeed, inaccessibility due to claims to propriety likely 
make this a significant challenge in the study of big data. Even 
where we might gain access, there is another challenge for users, 
namely that many are not knowledgeable or expert in these 
systems. Understanding how one’s data is used requires 
sophisticated technical understanding, and even among purported 
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experts, there is debate. There are also numerous questions about 
who has the appropriate kind of specialist or expert knowledge in 
terms of technical solutions and application to domain-specific 
problems. For Cambridge Analytica, it is not merely the technical 
proficiency in collecting user data that is a key part of the story. 
Additionally, part of the story is the psychological profiles that were 
developed (and their veracity) as well as the attendant but distinct 
claims about what those profiles afford in terms of persuasive 
capacities. In such cases there is always a danger of 
ultracrepidarianism, that is, of analysis by people who are not 
experts on the big data or user profiling, and it is not merely the 
general expert to whom we ought to look for answers, but the 
expert in the specific problem area we wish to address. 
Data Analytic Experts 
Appeals to big data do not only rely on the data, but on the idea of 
experts behind the scenes turning information into something 
meaningful. The appeal is one of an expert ethos, where some 
specialized knowledge or skills are used to perform what seems 
indistinguishable from magic: build a profile based on an array of 
data not only to really gain insight into the minds of individuals, 
but also to determine how to configure those individuals into 
groupings that one might then craft targeted messaging to in an 
effort to increase sales or, in the Cambridge Analytica case, to 
persuade voters. The appeal to being able to perform such feats is 
one that relies on expert status (ethos is, of course, distinct from 
expertise). But do those who claim such expert status have the 
goods, the skills to perform such tasks, and if they do, what are the 
requisite skills? Being able to collaborate with other experts on big 
data projects is one important ability (González-Bailón, 2013). 
Technical skills to design or operate databases and systems (e.g., 
Hadoop) are certainly part of the repertoire that some of those 
involved in big data projects will need, but we might think of most 
people operating with these skills at the level of mastery but 
perhaps not expertise. Beyond technical skills, there is a matter of 
data analytics, or making meaning of the data. Floridi (2012) 
identifies among these skills the ability to identify “small patterns” 
(p. 436). As a feature of big data, it is not the traditional model of 
inventive potential that the topoi of data structures, databases, 
ontologies, etc.,4 provide but rather a different sort of idioi topoi—
 
4 Invention with topoi has been identified as a key approach to the 
construction of scientific (e.g., Walsh [now Olman], 2010) and technical 
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they are neither common topics nor disciplinary knowledge per se, 
but rather something between. Specialized and situated, but not 
domain-specific, necessarily. 
Seeming purposelessness in big data (recalling Kitchin & 
McArdle, 2016) then is a matter of rhetorical vantage and acumen. 
For experts in this realm, the apprehension of meaningful small 
patterns is generative of purpose. Purpose is not an operation in 
discovery but rather a matter of invention. And that is precisely the 
kind of work involved in creating an app that simulated a 
psychology test but in actuality obtained permission to harvest the 
user’s Facebook profile data and the data of their friends’ accounts. 
Analytics experts at Cambridge Analytica were then able to build 
models of users and then design and user-test ads specially 
designed for these “universes” of user types, or “psycho-graphics” 
(Bartlett, 2018). Further, crafting personas or understanding the 
composition of one’s audience and their personalities or character 
is not itself new. 
University of Cambridge research news published an article in 
2011 entitled “Cambridge researchers have created a website that 
combines the Facebook profiles of fans of companies and public 
figures with personality testing to create what they are describing as 
a ‘revolutionary’ new marketing tool.” Kosinski and Stillwell, 
Kogan’s two colleagues, remember, conducted work that is 
foundational to but distinct from Kogan’s dealings with Cambridge 
Analytica. The locus of expertise, the expert ethos, and the expert 
insights that Cambridge Analytica claims to offer are illuminated by 
Kosinski and Stillwell’s research. The article discusses a new 
website, LikeAudience.com, which “was created by Michal Kosinski 
and David Stillwell, both researchers at the University of 
Cambridge's Psychometrics Centre” (University of Cambridge, 
2011, para. 7). Explaining how different Facebook page likes can 
offer insights into personalities, Kosinski writes,  
For the first time, it means that companies, politicians, 
celebrities and anyone else with a Facebook presence can 
 
knowledge (e.g., Roundtree, 2016). For example, Hartzog (2015) 
examines the Aedes aegypti mosquito in VectorBase and its Dengue Fever 
Ontology (IDODEN) and argues that the organization and 
standardization of the database operates as a “tool of rhetorical 
invention” by crafting topoi (following Walsh’s [now Olman’s], 2010, 
model) from which arguments might be drawn from the ontologically 
(computational) “linked” or structural data (p. 10). 
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investigate not just how many people “like” them—they 
can also draw up a detailed profile that includes 
information about their average follower’s personality, 
IQ and satisfaction with life. Other data such as the 
gender balance and average age of their fanbase is also 
made available. (University of Cambridge, 2011, para. 4) 
The data, Kosinski states, comes from an app they created that 
provided a personality test along with these Facebook data. Using 
the “Big Five” personality traits (i.e., conscientiousness, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and stability, with 
continuums within these), the app generates data combined with 
“[o]ther apps, such as an IQ test ... All of this data is then combined 
with the participant’s Facebook profile information—such as their 
age, hometown, and relationship status” (University of Cambridge, 
2011, para. 12). The data is the sell: 
LikeAudience’s creators believe that it will be of 
particular value to marketers, who will be able to 
uncover new potential audiences for their advertising 
campaigns, and exploitable niches based on the fans of 
their closest rivals. The potential significance for 
politicians, particularly when on the election trail, is also 
clear—although it can throw up some interesting results. 
(University of Cambridge, 2011, para. 14) 
Let us consider two of these profiles offered as examples in the 
article from Cambridge University research news, which appear in 
an appendix-like section to the article with the title “10 profiles 
from LikeAudience”: 
2. Sarah Palin 
Who likes her? People with a strong sense of tradition, 
and in particular people who like order, structure and 
self-discipline. Palin appeals to older people with high 
life satisfaction and, for a self-confessed “hockey mom”, 
her Facebook fanbase has a male bias. 
What do they like? Former US President George W. 
Bush, the patriotic “United States of America Fan Page”, 
Pizza Hut and the Seattle Seahawks. (University of 
Cambridge, 2011 paras. 21–23) 
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And, as a second, perhaps less political and more market-based 
example, 
9. Radiohead 
Who likes them? Average fans exhibit high openness, 
which suggests they are imaginative, curious, creative 
and sensitive to beauty. They also have high IQs and not 
many friends compared with your typical Facebook user. 
Coincidentally, this fits the profile of a paranoid android. 
What do they like? The film adaptation of Hunter S. 
Thompson’s Fear And Loathing In Last Vegas; William 
Golding’s novel Lord Of The Flies, Tarantino’s Kill Bill 
series, and Monty Python And The Holy Grail. 
(University of Cambridge, 2011, paras. 42–44) 
We chose these examples for their range, but it is certainly worth 
examining all 10 in an effort to understand the patterns in these 
profiles. What we can see here, however, is that the profiles are not 
entirely surprising. Even the seemingly insightful appeal that 
Palin’s fanbase skews male is not surprising: A CNN survey in 2008 
reported that men had a more favorable opinion of Palin 
(Steinhauser, 2008). As a profile, the analysis of Radiohead is 
particularly interesting in the obscure reference to “fit[ting] the 
profile of a paranoid android.” Several references mark certain 
associations that might also be unsurprising if one were to look at 
the data from a generational perspective. “Kill Bill” and “Fear and 
Loathing in Las Vegas” were released around the same time and 
Radiohead was quite popular at the time, so there is likely a group 
of people that came of age during that period who this would have 
appealed to. And this demographic would have likely read Lord of 
the Flies in high school and “Monty Python and the Holy Grail,” 
although predating Radiohead, likely fit as a part of the cultural 
package for certain teenagers or young adults at the time. 
Kogan and business partner Joseph Chancellor, recall, were said 
to have excluded Kosinski and Stillwell from the negotiations with 
SCL (Lewis, Grierson, & Weaver, 2018). Later, Kogan would tell 
Sumpter (2018) that he did not believe the correlation between 
likes and personality were particularly strong, and specifically cites 
CEO Nix as not understanding what Kogan’s work did, saying “Nix 
has very little comprehension of what he is talking about,” and that 
“He is trying to promote [the personality algorithm] because he has 
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a strong financial incentive to tell a story about how Cambridge 
Analytica have a secret weapon” (Kogan qtd. in Sumpter, 2018, 
para. 15). Of Wylie, the so-called whistleblower, Kogan told 
Sumpter “He is speaking outside of his expertise. He’s not a data 
scientist. At SCL, he dealt with business development and data law. 
He had no role I know of in handling data and certainly no role in 
modeling” (Kogan qtd. in Sumpter, 2018, para. 21). Some of those 
outside the debate, looking in, are not convinced about the science 
behind this approach either, and some are not even convinced 
about the quality of predictions that data from Facebook itself can 
help us make (Broad, 2018). Gibney (2018) outlines in Nature 
some of the scientific debate in psychology and allied areas of 
research about the effectiveness of micro-targeting based on 
personality in marketing and voter influence in comparison to other 
forms of targeting. The findings are less impressive than the claims 
made by Cambridge Analytica (at times) and the numerous stories 
reporting the company’s data activities. We say “at times” because 
CEO Nix himself has said, when brought before U.K. Parliament, 
that Kogan’s research on Facebook data in the creation of 
personality profiles “proved to be fruitless” (Nix qtd. in Gibney, 
2018, para. 16)  and, when speaking with NPR, that “hundreds of 
thousands of Americans” were surveyed as the basis of Cambridge 
Analytica’s profiles (Nix qtd. in Gibney, 2018, para. 17). Marketing 
researchers took to The Conversation to share their field’s 
qualifications on the grandiose claims of big data’s power to craft 
personality profiles that will have much success, explaining that 
research dating back to the 1990s illustrated that “abstracted and 
universalised personality type cannot capture the complexity and 
cultural sensitivity of consumer lifestyle choices, symbolic 
expression and tastes” and that “This shift in thinking put an end to 
the wider application of psychographic methods long ago, at least in 
the field of marketing and consumer research” (Rokka & Airoldi, 
2018, paras. 11–12). Kosinski, though, disagrees and still sees 
dangers in the approach. Sumpter spoke with Kosinski and 
observes “[h]e sees the correlation between Facebook likes and 
psychologists’ personality scores as a side-effect of the deeper 
understanding algorithms have of us than we have of ourselves” 
(Sumpter, 2018, para. 25). 
What is the legitimacy of these claims to expertise? We don’t 
know. It is, however, compelling to learn that researchers and 
specialists in psychology, marketing research, and high tech itself 
(Fish, 2018) all question the validity of the claims concerning how 
data was used and the likelihood that such approaches themselves 
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will be successful to the degree that Cambridge Analytica seemingly 
banked on. Still, their persuasiveness to clients relied on their 
purportedly data-driven approach—their “secret weapon”—and 
consistently drove Cambridge Analytica’s public persona through 
the company motto and name (cf. Confessore & Hakim, 2017). The 
appeal to expertise in this case is concerning because the idea of the 
expert is one that is necessarily relational, meaning that part of 
being an expert is being recognized as such by colleagues working 
in similar or related areas. The Cambridge Analytica case thus 
contributes to an undermining of trust among (purported) 
technical experts and publics. Although we might dismiss matters 
here as a singular case, the broader concerns about what 
technologies are capable of and the ethical concerns raised in this 
essay are much more pervasive than would allow such an easy 
casting aside. Illustrated in this case is the importance of 
understanding how broad expert appeals on the grounds of 
technical specialism can work to redirect attention from the 
speaker’s ethos to the presumed logos of the data. However, as we 
have argued, data, big data, and the entailments surrounding big 
data, are not merely matters for reason, or fact, etc., but rather 
firmly in the domain of rhetorical appeals. Little consensus among 
experts in the particular case of Cambridge Analytica points to a 
wider debate about big data and its applications—indeed, its 
meaning, too. 
Such uncertainty is a problem when the stakes are as high as 
functioning democracies. Indeed, scientists are held to a higher 
standard, including among rhetoricians. As Ceccarelli (2020) 
recently argued, extending her work with Pietrucci (Pietrucci & 
Ceccarelli, 2019), scientists “have an ethical obligation to 
communicate about risks they are uniquely qualified to recognize, 
and to do so in a way that makes their knowledge accessible to their 
fellow citizens of the world who would otherwise be forced to act 
without all they need to make good decisions” (p. 241). Here we 
have a case where not only have the experts (as such) failed to do 
so, but, further, created conditions to undermine the ability of 
citizens to make good decisions. As Wilson (2020) argues in an 
analysis of Facebook and the importance of ethos and dwelling, “it 
is the connections we have in our ethe ecologies that we trust, not 
technologies that were created for purposes against our best 
interests” (p. 227). Among those connections, broadly, we might 
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Final Remarks 
Data and other technology are only part of the story in this case 
study—as are the elements of big data and broader technological 
tools—and a rhetorical account of the human elements are, too, 
critical. As Delfanti and Frey (2020) note in their study of Amazon’s 
efforts to automate their warehouses, using humans to extend 
machines, “[h]uman labor—the input it provides to machinery and 
the values it generates—must remain at the center of analyses of 
automation,” and we would say that, explicitly, of big data, too (p. 
21). Pausing to look at the rhetorical appeals that are ultimately 
made—after all the promises of impressive, big data, sophisticated 
computer models and profiles, psychographics, user universes, and 
micro-targeting—Cambridge Analytica Global Political Managing 
Director Mark Turnbull’s words reveal the ancient understanding 
that drives the messaging. Turnbull’s argument, captured in the 
Channel 4 News undercover footage, is that the motivations of the 
average voter are “the two fundamental human drivers, ... hopes 
and fears, and many of those are unspoken and even unconscious,” 
adding:  
You didn’t even know that was a fear until you saw 
something that just evoked that reaction from you and 
our job is to drop the bucket further down the well than 
anybody else to understand what are those really deep-
seated underlying fears, concerns. There is no good 
fighting an election campaign on the facts because 
actually it’s all about emotion. (Turnbull qtd. in Channel 
4 News, 2018) 
Aristotle told us that fear (phobos) can be defined as “a sort of 
pain or agitation derived from the imagination” (phantasia), and 
that fear is future-oriented in that it anticipates “destructive or 
painful evil” (Arist. Rhet. II.5.1, 1382a, trans. Kennedy). Further, 
Aristotle noted the importance of fear in deliberative speech, telling 
us that “fear makes people inclined to deliberation; while no one 
deliberates about hopeless things” (Arist. Rhet. II.5.13, 1383a, 
trans. Kennedy). Echoing across the millennia, these words are 
comported for concerning ends when applied to swaying voters 
today, but their rhetorical insight is not lessened. Indeed, the 
rhetorical effectiveness of such appeals, when unrestricted by 
norms and values held to be central to democratic engagement 
(such as truth, honesty, mutual understanding, trust, etc.), may be 
all the more so effective. Preserving our personal privacy and our 
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data rights then must also come with a call to preserve our 
rhetorical tools for assessing the claims about what these 
technological processes can do as well as the degree to which they 
can and do deliver. Are we receiving data-driven, technologically-
designed, micro-targeted messages that are the product of a 
technological system’s deep insights into ourselves, or are the 
messages rhetorical appeals we already know and effective not 
because of the hardware we have built and the data we have 
amassed, but more so because of the wetware within which we each 
reside and our relational, social, and, indeed, moral comportment 
toward one another? As we consider this case, we turn to Aristotle, 
who himself offered something akin to “profiles,” wherein he spoke 
of the character of the young, the old, those in their prime, the 
powerful, and so on. In Book II of Rhetoric, of those affected by 
dynamis (power), Aristotle, while describing their virtues, cautions 
of their vices: “if they commit wrong, they do it on a large, not a 
small, scale” (Arist. Rhet. II.17.4, 1391a, trans. Kennedy).  
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